France has yet to actively push the idea of replacing the U.S. nuclear umbrella with its own deterrent force, but the concept continues to surface in strategic discussions, particularly as Europe rethinks its security architecture amid rising threats. A key question lies at the heart of the debate: does Paris have the political will, psychological readiness, and nuclear capability to protect Europe?

Axar.az informs, citing Defense Express, this topic is the focus of a recent analysis published by War on the Rocks, which essentially argues the following: for France to offer a credible nuclear umbrella to Europe, it must be willing to use nuclear weapons, even to the extent of destroying Moscow. But is France truly prepared to make such a commitment?

France became a nuclear power in 1968 under President Charles de Gaulle, who formulated a core principle of French nuclear doctrine known as dissuasion du faible au fort — the "ambiguity of deterrence." Under this concept, adversaries should never be certain how far France is willing to go in employing nuclear weapons. Strategic ambiguity is intended to enhance deterrence by keeping potential enemies guessing.

But when it comes to extending that deterrence beyond France’s borders, to include European allies, ambiguity may not be enough. The psychological threshold for launching a nuclear strike in defense of another nation, even a close partner, is vastly higher than defending one’s own territory. And this is precisely where doubts begin to surface.

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